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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

R. J. PENMAN,
Plaintiff amd Appellant,

-vs.-

THE EIMCO CORPORATION,
a. corporation,
Defe·nda·nt and Respondent.

Appellant's Brief
Appeal from the District Court of the
Third Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake County.
The Honorable Clarence E. Baker, Judge.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
R. J.

PEN~f.A_N,
Plaintz~jj·

and Appellant,

-YS.-

THE EIMCO CORPORATION,
a corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

Appellant's Brief
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The plaintiff and appellant above brought this action in the City Court of Salt Lake City, Salt Lake
County, State .of Utah, to recover from the defendant
and respondent the sum of $808.45, together with interest from and since February 15, 1944, and plaintiff's
costs, said sum alleged in the complaint to be due the
plaintiff from the defendant for certain work performed
by the plaintiff for the defendant at the Tooele Ordnance Depot in Tooele County, State of Utah. It is
1
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alleged that the plaintiff was employed by the defendant
to go to the Tooele Ordnance Depot to cut, load and
haul in certain arch steel trusses that had been used as
ceiling joists for ammunition igloos. The object of
cutting the trusses at Tooele was so that they could get
a larger freight load on the car so that the freight rate
would be held down to a minimum and that in cutting
the trusses into pieces it was necessary that plaintiff
employ certain men with acetylene torches and that the
cost of the cutting of the trusses was a total of $1563.50,
and that there was owing on another account the sum
of $84.55, which was admitted, making a total due of
$1658.05 upon which account there had been paid the
plaintiff the sum of $849.60, and that there was a balance due of $808.45, together with interest at the legal
rate from and since the same became due. To the complaint the defendant and respondent filed its answer
admitting the allegations of paragraph 1 of the com..
plaint and alleging that the defendant became indebted
to the plaintiff in the sum of $2,204.37 for the preparation and transportation of steel scrap from the Tooele
Ordnance Depot to Salt Lake City, Utah, and denies
the r~maining allegations, and in further ans,ver alleges
that they advanced to the plaintiff in connection with
the service $2,519.42 and denies that the defendant is
indebted in any sum to the plaintiff, and then allege a
counter-claim wherein they allege that the defendant
employed the plaintiff to transport certain steel from
the Tooele Ordnance Plant to the Salt Lake City plant
of the defendant at the agreed price of $2.00 per ton,
and that he entered upon said employment and earned
2
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upon said eontraet thl} ~nun of $1()()9.82, and admit that
thereaftpr the contrnrt W'HS modified in that the defpndant agreed to pay the defendant a reasonable value
for preparn tion of certain channel iron, a part of said
sernp material, and that the plaintiff prepared the same,
and that the reasonable Yalue of the preparation was
the sum of $430.00, plus a sales commission of $84.55.
That they then plead that pursuant to the contract the
tlefendant adYaneed to the plaintiff the sum of $2,519.42,
and that the same '\Tas $315.10 more than the sum earned
by the plaintiff under the contract and then alleged that
the plaintiff abandoned the contract and failed to finish
the preparation and hauling of said scrap material.
They then pray that the plaintiff take nothing by his
complaint and that the defendant have judgment
against the plaintiff for $315.10.
STATEMENT OF FACT
The plaintiff appeals from the judgment of the
court denying the plaintiff recovery upon his said complaint and granting the defendant judgment upon his
counter-claim in the sum of $45.30. The facts in the
case are as follows :
The plaintiff who had been in times past employed
by the defendant to do certain work for them was employed to haul from the Tooele Ordnance Depot to Salt
I.Jake City to the defendant's place of business certain
steel igloo arches at $2.00 per ton. The freight upon
these shipments on -the railroad was 65c per ton based
3
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upon a load of sixty thousand pounds. The plaintiff
after shipping a few car loads found that he could only
load fifteen tons on a car or thirty thousand pounds of
weight. However, he was charged for the full capacity
of the car and instead of paying freight on the amount
loaded in the car was required to pay freight on double
the amount loaded, or where the freight rate was 65c
per ton for a full car load, it increased to $1.30 per ton
for the amount the plaintiff could load in a car. After
the trusses reached the place of business of the defendant in Salt Lake City they were cut up into pieees
with acetylene torches. This being a fact and being
known by the plaintiff, he approached the man in charge
for the defendant and requested that he be permitted
to do the cutting of the trusses at the Tooele Ordnance
Depot before they were loaded and in order that he
could get a full load on a railroad car. This privilege
was granted to the plaintiff by the defendant. However,
no price was fixed at the time of the granting of the
privilege to be paid for the cutting. The agreement to
cut the igloos at the Tooele Ordnance Depot was a separate contract between plaintiff and defendant and had
nothing to do with and did not interfere with the $2.00
per ton price for transporting it from the Tooele Ordnance Depot to the defendant's place of business at
Salt Lake City, but 'vas a separate contract for doing
the cutting. After this arrangement was made, the
plaintiff went back to the Tooele Ordnance Depot 'vith
several acetylene torch operators, together with the
torches and cut up the igloo arches into pieces, if requiring eight cuts to each arch, and during the cutting
4
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proep~s

tht' dl'fendant adv·nnced to tho plaintiff the sum
of $849.60 for oxygen, employees' wages, etc. The
amount rhnrged for rntting at the Tooele Ordnance
Depot '"'as as follo"Ts :
Aeetylene torrh operators, $3.00 per hour
"Tith time and one-half for oYer time. That under
this arrangement, there were 304 hours, amounting to $91~.00 for the straight time and $283.50
for the over time, a total of $1195.50. For the
other labor performed there, the plaintiff charged
at the rate of $2.00 per hour. (Tr. p. 8.)
Then there was charged $25.00 per trip to
Salt Lake City 'vith a truck to haul out supplies
to do the cutting, for four trips, $100.00. (Tr. p.
9) and $84.50 due on a commission, making a
total due the plaintiff of $1658.05 on that particular job, of which sum the defendant paid
$849.60, leaving a balance due the plaintiff from
the defendant the sumof $808.45. (Tr. p. 10.)
and for this amount the plaintiff sues the defendant.

It ""as further sho,vn by the evidence that very
shortly after all of the cutting was done at the Tooele
Ordnance Depot, the defendant terminated the plaintiff's hauling contract so that he was unable to haul the
material 'vhich he had cut down under the special eontract. Upon the trial of this case the court found the
issues against the plaintiff "no cause of action" and in
favor of the defendant for $45.30.
The case was first tried in the City Court of Salt
Lake City and the court there rendered a judgment for
the plaintiff and against the defendant for the sum of
5
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$609.95, together with costs. From this judgment the
defendant appealed to the Third Judicial District Court
of Salt Lake County. Said Notice of Appeal having
been served on the 6th day of February, 1947. On the
28th day of May, 1947, the said Appeal had not been
docketed with the Clerk of the District Court, although
the same was transferred to the District Court of Salt
Lake County on the 8th day of February, 1947, two
days after the Notice of Appeal 'vas served and filed.
On the 28th day of May, 1947, 108 days after the record
reached the District Court of Salt Lake County, the
plaintiff filed a motion with the District Court to dismiss
the appeal for failure to docket the appeal within the
statutory period of thirty days after the same was received by the Clerk of the District Court, and upon the
filing of this motion, the motion was granted and the
court entered its order dismissing the appeal and
directing the Clerk of the Court to return the files and
records to the Clerk of the City Court of Salt Lake City.
On the fifth day of June, 1947, the defendant filed a
motion to reinstate the appeal basing the motion upon
the fact that the Clerk of the District Court had agreed
to advise the defendant \Vhen the record reached his
office and asking that the order of the court dismissing
the appeal be set aside and the appeal be reinstated
through the defendant's mistake, inadvertance and excusable mistake and neglect. All of which was never
established or shown. Upon the filing of this motion
the plaintiff then again filed an affidavit and motion for
the dismissal of the appeal, and on the 16th day of June,
1947, the court vacated its former order dismissing the
6
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appeal and denied the plaintiff's affidavit and motion
of June 11th to dismiss the appeal and permitted the
defendant to file and docket the appeal in· the District
Court.
ASSIGN~IENTS

OF ERROR

Comes no'v the appellant and makes the following
assignments of error upon ·w·hich he will reply for a
reversal of judgment appealed from in this cause:
1. That the court erred in making and entering
its order vacating and setting aside its former order
dismissing the appeal and in reinstating the action in
the District Court and also erred in denying the defendant's motion based upon affidavit served and filed
June 11, 1947, to dismiss the appeal.
2. The Court erred in denying the plaintiff judgment in the trial of said action in the District Court
and entering judgment in favor of the defendant in
said case.
3. The Court erred 1n denying plaintiff's motion
for a new trial.

ARGUMENT
The evidence in this case shows 1n effect the following facts:
That the plaintiff had for sometime previously and
upon various occasions -been employed by the defendant

7
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to do certain work for the defendant, and that the work
in question was to haul some steel girder irons which
had been made for the purpose of building roofs on the
government igloos; that they were a sort of truss affair
made with channel iron and were approximately 15 feet
long and braced at the inner part. (Tr. 5.) That the
intention was that these pieces of material were to be
loaded into cars and shipped to Salt Lake City at $2.00
per ton, the plaintiff paying 65c per ton freight, leaving
him a net balance for handling the material of $1.35 per
ton. It was shown that the cars could carry 30 tons or
60,000 pounds, however, after shipping a few car loads
the plaintiff found that he could only load 15 tons of
material on the car, but would have to pay freight on
a full 60,000 pound car which would increase his freight
per ton to $1.30, leaving him only 7·0c per ton net on
the material; that upon learning that he would lose
money in the .operation, he approached the defendant,~
Mr. Rosenblatt of the defendant company, and entered
into a contract with him to cut the channels before loading so that he could get a full car load of 60,000 pounds
on the car, to which Rosenblatt consented and agreed.
(Tr. p. 6.) Pursuant thereto the plaintiff went ahead
and cut 1960 of these trusses which included eight cuts
to the truss ; that in doing this work it 'vas necessary
for the plaintiff to hire three torch men and two other
men to do the work advantageously; that the plaintiff
agreed with the defendant that he would cut the material
down on a time basis and would charge for time and
material to cut the trusses down. (Tr. p. 7); that pursuant to that contract the acetylene torch men worked
8
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304 hours and 63 hours oYer time, nnd that. the reasonable value of said "~ork 'vas $3.00 per hour for the men
,,~ith the mar hines for straight t inlP, "\vith time and onehalf for oYer time, or $4.50 per hour for the over time;
that such amounted to $1195.50. That the reasonable
Yalue for tht~ other t'vo men working "\Yas $2.00 per hour
and. time and one-half for over time. (Tr. p. 8.) That
there 'Yere four hours OYer time and that there would
be l~i7 hours straight time; that he made four trips to
Salt Lake City 'vith the truck to haul out acetylene and
materials for use on the job at $25.00 per trip, a total
of $100.00 for that work; that there "\vas $84.50 due to
him as commission on another account. (Tr. p. 9.)
This would make a total due to the plaintiff in the sum
of $2519.42, and that on said job the defendant had advanced to the plaintiff the sum of $1658.05, leaving a
balance due the plaintiff from the defendant of $808.45.
(Tr. p. 10.)
It seems that the defendant rendered a statement
to the plaintiff, marked "Exhibit A" in 'vhich it "\Vas
shown on advances, on the cutting down job that there
was money due the defendant from the plaintiff on this
contract, and that that amount figures $1658.05, which
the plaintiff subtracted from the amount due him of
$2466.50, and leaving the same balance of $808.45. ( Tr.
p. 11.) There is a discrepancy in the account of $52.92,
but the evidence does not disclose what it consists of.
The defendant upon cross examination attempted
to illicit from the plaintiff that he agreed to cut the
9
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irons in the field at the same price the defendant could
cut them in the shop at Salt Lake City, to which the
plaintiff answered, "I didn't say as cheap. I said we
could cut them with a torch out there.'' ( Tr. P· 16.)
That there were eight cuts made on each truss. (Tr. P·
18.) That the plaintiff paid for the acetylene used on
the job $133.00 to $140.00. (Tr. p. 22.) That there was
no pipe on the channel. (Tr. p. 24.)
On redirect examination, the plaintiff testified that
the regular price for cutting material with acetylene
torches was $3.00 per hour and that was true of the
local shops in Salt Lake City; that after he got all of
the arches cut up and ready to ship, he \Vas taken off
the job by the defendant and was not permitted to haul
the material into Salt I__Jake City, and that he was deprived not only of the extra money due him for the
cutting but for his profit in hauling of the same also.
( Tr. p. 26.) That the trusses had to he cut either at
Tooele on the job or here in Salt Lake City. (Tr. p. 27.)

G. HENRY STARTUP, a witness for the plaintiff, testified as follows :
That he was a practical engineer and engaged in
buying and selling, government surplus. That in 1944,
he was working for the Monsey Iron and Steel Company
as a practical engineer; that he is familiar with the
operation of acetylene torches, and that all jobs in Salt
Lake City regulated by the OPA was $3.00 per hour as
the prevailing price, which included men and equipment. (Tr. p. 28.) He further testified that \\'"ork out
10
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in the fit.?ld, as \Yns done on these trusses at Tooele, \VHR
diffprent and that a man in a shop at Salt Lake City could
do t\vo to three times as much entting ns he could out in
the field "There tlH•se trusses \Yt•re cut, and he again testifies that $3.00 per hour \vould be a reasonable sum for
such rutting. and that his statement of the price per hour
for such \York in Snlt I_.ake City in the shops in 1944 when
this ''?ork ,,·as done "Tonld be $3.00 per hour. (T. p. 29.)
The defendant then called a Rufus Erickson as a
witness who testified that he was a material cutter for
the Eimco Corporation in Salt Lake City and has been
sinee 19:28; that he had cut a good many of the trusses
in question; that he has cut up in the shop 130 trusses
in an eight hour shift, but that he made three less cuts
on each truss than was made by the plaintiff in this
case. ( Tr. p. 33.) That he works on a regular basis c,f
95c per hour in the shop with everything furnished him.
To which question and answer the plaintiff made an
objection \vhich was overruled by the Court. Upon
cross examination the witness testified that he was paid
time and one-haif for over time and Sundays, and that
everything \vas furnished him including all material,
torches, oxygen and everything necessary to make the
cuts in the shop. ( Tr. p. 36.)
A. H. HoLTMAN, a witness for the defendant, testified as follovvs:
That he \vas engaged 1n buying and preparing
scrap iron for melting purposes. (Tr. p. 36.) That when
asked \\rhat \\ 0uld be a reasonable cost value on an
7
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hourly basis on the cutting, the witness answered. "I
guess that would vary. If he paid his man $3.00 an hour,
which I thought was high; I was hiring men cheaper
at that time. What were you paying your men~ I was
paying my men $1.20 an hour." (Tr. p. 38.)
When the witness was asked upon cross examination if he had ever cut any of these trusses, he answered
that he never did. He testified that if the pipes \vere
full of oil and scale iron, they would be more difficult
to cut, and when asked how much more difficult, stated
that would be hard to say. (Tr. p. 39.)
It will be noted that in this man's testimony on
page 37 and again on page 39, the transcript has been
changed with a red penciL We deem that this change
was unauthorized and "re are unable to determine how
a reporter could have mistaken the words he wrote in
the transcript for the red pencil corrections, and we
assume that the reporter got the testimony correct from
the witness.
Upon redirect examination the witness testified
that it would take twenty minutes to cut up one truss,
and that he was mistaken when he said it would take
ten minutes, but on further redirect examination he did
not seem to know anything about the matter in question.
(Tr. pages 42 and 43.)
SIMON RosENBLATT, a witness for the defendant testified as. follows :
''That he is an official of the Eimco Corporation,
being the secretary thereof; that he manages scrap iron
12
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and snlYag-e for said company; that he had known the
plaintiff for eight or ten years, and that during that
time they had a. number of contracts with him. That he
entered into a contract with the plaintiff to haul material from the Tooele Ordnance Depot at Tooele to the
company's place of business at $2.00 per ton. That at
the suggestion of the plaintiff, he was permitted to cut
up the pipe at the field in order that he might haul a
greater load on the cars; that he agreed to the arrangement, but in telling the plaintiff to go ahead and that
they would make an extra allowance to him when the
job was finished, but it would be based upon their own
costs in their O\Vll yard. At his counsel's suggestion he
said that he would not allow the plaintiff to do the
cutting if the cost \Vas greater than in the defendant's
O"\\...n yard. (Tr. p. 47.) That they advanced money to
him every Saturday to meet his payroll and pay his
bills. ( Tr. p. 48.) Plaintiff's Exhibit No. '' 1 '' was then
sho\\. .11 to the ,,. . itness. (Tr. p. 49.) At. which time the
witness was asked the follo\\ring questions and made the
follo\ving ans\vers.

"Q. Did you have any discussion with him
then concerning the last line which appears on
there, 'special allo\vance yet to be made for
cutting channel pipes' 1
A.

Yes, I did.

Q. What was the purpose of that discussion~

A. I told him at that time we would arrive
at some mutual understanding, just what he was
entitled to for that payment.

13
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Did you have any discussion 1n dollars
and cents what that should be.
Q.

A. Not at that time, no.
Q. Did he ever submit a statement to you
what he thought he would be entitled to for the
cutting .of pipes~

at

A.

Never.

Q.

Never submitted any statement to you

all~

A.

No, never.

Did you have any further discussion
with Mr. Penman concerning the fair and reasonable value for cutting these pipes between February 15, 1944, the date of Exhibit ''A'' and the
time the suit started~
Q.

A. No, he had never been around."
pages 50 and 51.)

(Tr.

That the arrangement with Mr. Penman became at
an end because he wasn't delivering the tonnage, and
that they had to have scrap in their yard for his customers; that he told the plaintiff that, and that was about
the time that he handed him the statement. (Tr. p. 52.)
On cross examination the witness testified that after
the trusses were cut up at Tooele, the plaintiff was taken
off the j~b by the defendant, his contract being terminated; that when this contract for cutting was made
with the plaintiff he told him that the job would be based
upon the Salt Lake shop price basis, but that it was
never discussed between them as to what that cost was.
(Tr. p. 54.) That the witness then testified that he was

14
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sent a letter by an attorney for the plaintiff and that
the attorney came 'vith the plaintiff to his office and
later talked to the 'Yitness about this very matter in
eontroversy, and that in that discussion he refused to
pay the money demanded but did not offer to pay anything different than that demanded or to indicate to the
plaintiff ,,·hat his claims were concerning· the account.
(Tr. p. 56.) The "·itness then testified as follows:

"Q. But you knew this work was being done
out there by ~[r. Penman, didn't you 1

A.

Yes.

Q.

And you agreed to it 1

A.

I can't answer that yes or no.

Q. I am not asking that ; I am asking
'Yhether you agreed on a price~
A. I told him if he wanted to cut some pipes
out there to his O\Vn advantage, to go ahead and
do it.

for

Q.

You intended to pa.y him for it?

A.

I told him I would.

Q.

You intended to pay a reasonable value

it~

A.

Not the kind of profit set out there.

Q. I didn't ask that question; you intended
to pay a reasonable value for it~
A. Based on our cost of cutting it in our
own yard.

Q. You certainly wouldn't expect me to do
it and pay more than we could do it in our own
yard, would you~

15
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present~

Q.

Who was

A.

Just he and I." (Tr. p. 57.)

The defendant then closed its case and the plaintiff
was called back for another question. He was asked:

"Q. Mr. Penman, I will ask you whether or
not during any conversation you had with Mr.
Rosenblatt concerning this matter, if he ever told
you the amount they would pay would be based
on their costs in the shop there~

A. No, he didn't.
time~

Q.

Not at any

A.

No.

Q.

Was there ever anything said about the

price~''

A.

No." (Tr. p. 58.)

Concerning the dismissal of the appeal, it will be
noted that the court entered an order dismissing the
same without the motion having been served upon the
adverse party. An application was made to recall the
order, and when that matter was heard and the application recalled because of no notice, the plaintiff then
filed another motion to dismiss the appeal which motion
had been duly served upon the defendant in the action.
The court denied that motion.
It will be noted that the transcript of the City Court
of the record had been in the District Court lying there
and not filed for a period of four months, and the defendant in support of his motion filed an affidavit setting forth the ground upon which his motion would be
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based, 'vhirh affidavit rPrited the purported grounds
for the position of the plaintiff in the matter, and in
that affidavit he recites that the fee was paid to the
Clerk of the City Court on the appeal on the 7th day of
February, 1947: that the clerk of the District Court
failed to notify the attorneys for the defendant when
the record "Tas received from the Clerk of the City
Court, and that the docketing fee was not paid because
no request or notire had been received from the Clerk
of the District Court according to agreement and failure
to pay the fee 'vas due to the mistake, inadvertance and
excusable mistake by the attorneys for the defendant.
Just 'vhy the plaintiff in the action had to be charged
"Tith an agreement between the defendant and the Clerk
of the District Court we have been unable to determine,
and the affidavit does not enlighten us. Neither does
the affidavit state what constituted the mistake, inadvertance and excusable neglect by the attorneys for the
defendant. Only carelessness eould be responsible for
their neglect to docket the appeal as these men have been
practicing law for a good many years and undoubtedly
\vere familiar with the rules of the court in taking appeals, and the plaintiff submits that the affidavit was
not sufficient to justify the court in denying the plaintiff's motion to dismiss the appeal. The plaintiff had already paid the cost of docketing the appeal for the purpose of its dismiS'sal.
The question then ar1ses, if the court in its discretion can permit a party appealing a case from the
City Court to the District Court to pay the filing fee
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for the docketing of the appeal in the District Court
four months after the papers have reached the District
Court on the appeal, and after a motion had been ma.qe
to dismiss the appeal, and pursuant to said motion the
docketing fee had been paid for such purpose, without
any· showing upon the part of the party neglecting his
appeal, then we ask the question how long can such a
condition exist before one would be entitled to have
an appeal dismissed~ If it can go on for four months,
we see no reason why it then could not be increased to
twenty-four months or even more, if the court happened
to be extra discretionary at the time the application
was made. We cannot conceive that the law permits
such a procedure. The statute is rather spceific in the
time allowed for this purpose, and we would assume
that some extraordinary situation must exist to relieve
an appellant of such a situation, such as perhaps the
illness of the attorney for the appealing party or so~e
other situation that could not with reasonable diligence
be remedied. We cannot conceive that this court's discretion can relieve a party under the circumstances
existing in this case.
In the case of I_Jittle vs. Blank, this court reveiwed
this particular situation in 31 Utah 222 at 227, as follows:
''The statute expressly provides that, on motion, appeals may be dismissed when the papers
were not filed and the advance fee required therefor was not paid within thirty days after the
t~a~script 'vas received by t~e clerk. This proVIsion of the statute was evidently intended to
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insure promptness in 1he filing· of the papers in
cases appealed in order that such cases may be
brought to trial in the district court without unnecessary or unreasonable delay. If the rule
. contended for hy appellant should obtain, the
party appealing 'Yonld have it in his power to
either indefinite!~~ postpone the trial of the case
in the district court or force the respondent to
file the papers in that court and pay the advance
fee required by la"', and thereby, in effect nullify
the provisions of section 3750 under consideration.''
Again in the case of Hoffman
a.t 170, "?e have the follo,~ving:

Y.

Lewis, 87 Pac. 167

''In view of the foregoing, we will now proceed to examine into the petitioner's rights under
the law giving appeals from justices' courts. Such
appeals are purely statutory, and the statutes
granting them must in all respects be at least
substantially complied with. The appeal in this
case \Yas dismissed upon the ground that the
sureties did not justify respecting their qualifieations, as required by law. Section 3747, Revised
Statutes of 1898. ''
We submit then that in this case the court abused
its discretion in denying the plaintiff's motion to dismiss the appeal after plaintiff had paid the cost of filing
said papers for such purpose, and had made a motion
to the court to dismiss the appeal.
Now, concerning the main ease, it appears that there
is not any la\v involved in the case or perhaps we better
say the law is very well settled concerning the matter
invoh"ed, and that is, does the evidence adduced at the
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trial of the case justify the decision of the court in
denying the plaintiff's right to recovery and granting
a judgment against the plaintiff in favor of the defendant.
It will be noted that the evidence of the plaintiff in
fixing the ·amount of money earned is rather definite,
that is, as to the time he put in with his hired men and
equipment and under his figures it is shown that he had
a balance due him upon the completion of the work of
$808.45. (Tr. p. 10.) Mr. G. Henry Startup, a disinterested witness testified for the plaintiff and stated
that he was definitely faimliar with prices paid upon
the market for the kind of work performed by the plaintiff, and that he was also familiar with the OP A regulation price on the work in question, and that it was
$3.00 per hour. (Tr. p. 28). And the· particular work
performed was submitted to the witness and he testified that $3.00 per hour was a very reasonable sum to
be paid for that kind of work, and that it ·could not be
done for that price at the time he was testifying. (Tr.
p. 29.) This would be where the party who performed
the work paid all of the cost incident thereto such as
was done in this case.
We have searched the testimony of the defendant
in this case and we do not find any contradictory testimony to this proposition in their evidence, and particularly all of the testimony of the defense was based
upon days pay work by men in the shop on a steady
salary or wage.
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We, therefore, submit that the court erred in its
decision and judgment in this case, and that the plaintiff is entitled to a reversal of the same and to a further order of this court directing the district court to
dismiss the plaintiff's appeal and remand the same back
to the city court for execution of its judgment as obtained therein.
Respectfully submitted,

E. LEROY SHIELDS,
Attorney for Pla.intiff.
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